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IN THE 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
its ROAD COMMISSION, D. H. 
WHITTENBURG, Chairman, H. J. 
CORLEISSEN and LAYTON MAX-
FIELD, Members of the State Road 
Commission, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. No. 8016 Civil 
COOPERATIVE SECURITY COR-
PORATION OF CHURCH OF 
JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY 
SAINTS, a non-profit corporation of 
the State of Utah, and WASATCH 
STAKE OF CHURCH OF JESUS 
CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY 
SAINTS, H. CLAY CUMMINGS, 
Trustee, and President of Wasatch 
Stake, a corporation sole of the State 
of Utah, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
ARTHUR WOOLLEY, 
Attorney for 
Defendants and Appellants. 
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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
its ROAD CO~E\IISSION, D. H. 
WHITTENBURG, Chairman, H. J. 
CORLEISSEN and LAYTON MAX-
FIELD, :Members of the State Road 
Commission, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
COOPERATIYE SECURITY COR-
PORATION OF CHURCH OF 
JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY 
SAINTS, a non-profit corporation of 
the State of Utah, and WASATCH 
STAKE OF CHURCH OF JESUS 
CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY 
SAINTS, H. CLAY CUMMINGS, 
Trustee, and President of Wasatch 
Stake, a corporation sole of the State 
of Utah, 
No. 8016 Civil 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This appeal is taken from the Judgment fixing the 
compensation to the owner upon condemnation, made and 
entered April 10, 1953, in the District Court of Wasatch 
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County, State of Utah, by the Honorable Joseph E. N el-
son, one of the Judges of said Court, sitting without a 
jury, after and in purported pursuance of the reversal 
by this Honorable Supreme Court of the judgment, made 
and .entered after trial before the same Judge in the 
cause, without a jury, and appealed to this Supreme 
Court by the plaintiff, State Road Commission. A mo-
tion for a re-hearing of the decision in this court was 
made and denied. 
State, by and through Road Commission, et al, 
vs. 
Cooperative Securities Corporation, etc. 
-U-
247 p (2d) 209 
After the remi tti ture had come down, Judge Nelson 
notified counsel for the parties to appear before him in 
the District Court of Wasatch County on March 13, 1953, 
and the Court calendar for that date noticed the said 
cause, ''To be set for trial.'' 
Mr. Budge, Deputy Attorney General for the Road 
Comn1ission, and Arthur Woolley, for the defendants 
(Mr. L. C. Montgomery of Heber City having recently 
died), appeared before the Court at the time fixed. 
The reporter did not report the proceedings before 
the Court at that time. The Attorney General had pre-
pared a proposed Order and Judgment which he handed 
up to the Court, and which is the same Order and J udg-
ment now appealed from. 
Counsel for the defendants contended that pursuant 
to the mandate of the Supreme Court stated in the deci-
sion on appeal, it was "necessary for the Court to re-
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assess the dmnage for the taking on a basis of the re-
placenlent eost. as well as to a:::;:::;e:::;:::; dan1n).!,·r:::;, if any, to 
the two snmll trarts whieh werP severed." 
The an10unts stated in the form of judgment"handed 
up by the Attorney General and adopted by the Court 
were calculated as follows: The area of the two small 
tracts was n1ultiplied by $400.00, and the sum divided 
by two, that is to say that these tracks were worth $400.00 
per acre and dan1aged 50% by the severance. The area 
taken, Yiz: 7.89 acres was multiplied by $400.00, and this 
amount in dollars \Yas added to the damage to the small 
tracts, and this is the sum and amount carried forward 
into the judgn1ent. 
Defendants' counsel contended that pursuant to the 
mandate of the Supreme Court, it was the duty of the 
Judge to determine the number of acres of land remain-
ing to Berg, and adjacent to the land of the Church, which, 
according to and hy comparison with the land of the 
Church taken in the condemnation, would be necessary 
to replace the 7.89 acres of land of the Church con-
domned, and that this number of Berg acres should be 
Inultiplied by .$400.00, the price fixed by Berg for his 
acres, and that this figure would be the replacement cost. 
The Court thereupon set the matter down for March 
27, 1953, at Heber City, when, his Honor stated, he would 
either sign the form of judgment presented by the At-
torney General, or enter an order that a hearing be had, 
and further stated that if he should decide to have a 
hearing to assess the damages, the matter would be heard 
on J\[ay -+, 1953, at Heber City. 
The Deputy Attorney General and counsel for the 
defendants appeared to attend the Court at Heber City 
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on March 27th. We were informed that Judge Nelson 
was ill, and was not able to appear. The matter did not 
come on. 
Thereafter, and without further notice to counsel, 
and under date of April10, 1953, in open Court at Heber 
City, according to the record, Judge Kelson signed the 
form of Order and Judgment as presented to him by the 
Attorney General on March 13, as aforesaid, and the 
judgment was entered by the clerk. Neither party was 
represented at that ~Pssion, and the defendants, at least, 
were not notified. 
This appeal is taken from this judgment so made 
and entered. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE JUDGMENT DOES NOT SUBSTANTIALLY 
COMPLY WITH THE DECISION AND MANDATE OF 
THE SUPREME COURT. 
POINT II 
THE AWARD WAS NOT ARRIVED AT IN ACCORD-
ANCE WITH THE RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT 
IN THE CASE. 
POINT III 
THE AWARD DOES NOT CONFORM TO THE 
PROOF IN THE CASE. 
POINT IV 
THE JUDGMENT DOES NOT AWARD JUST COM-
PENSATION TO DEFENDANTS. 
POINT V 
THE JUDGMENT IS AGAINST LAW. 
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.. , 
~\HllUMENT 
POINT I 
THE JUDGMENT DOES NOT SUBSTANTIALLY 
COMPLY WITH THE DECISION AND MANDATE OF 
THE SUPREME COURT. 
The judgment no\v appealed from finds: 
··That the replacement value of the seven and eighty-
nine hundredth acres (7.89) of the land of defendants 
taken by plaintiff for the purpose of right-of-way, 
was, on February 16, 1950, four hundred dollars per 
acre - that, therefore, defendants are entitled to 
judgment against plaintiff in the following amounts: 
Y alue of land taken 
(7.89 acres at $400.00 per acre) 
Damage to land not taken by reason 
$3,156.00 
of severance 734.63 
( 4.49 acres at 50% of $400.00 per acre) 
TOTAL $3,890.63'' 
Thus, it is manifest that the Court did not consider, 
or pass upon, or determine the comparative value of the 
land taken from the Church farm with the adjacent land 
of Berg, which would remain to him after part of his 
:S land was taken by the same highway improvement. 
Mr. Justice Wade, in the opinion of the Court on the 
appeal, pointed out that whereas the land to the east of 
the Church property had been valued by Berg at $400.00 
an acre, it might be determined that it would take more 
than 7.89 acres of Berg's land to equal, in value, the 7.89 
acres of land taken from the Church, and Justice Wade 
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further commented that even though under the applica-
tion of this formula it would have taken the entire 15.3 
acres (the total of Berg's land) to replace the 7.89 acres 
condemned, the amount would be much less than that 
granted by the Court, and therefore, the Supreme Court 
could not assume that the trial Court based its severance 
damages on the amount it would have cost respondents 
to replace the condemned land, which was a proper ele-
ment in determining the value of the condemned land. 
It is accepted as the rule of this case that there was 
no basis for severance damages as such, but that there-
placement cost should be the measure of damages. 
And it was and is the ruling of this Honorable Court 
in this case, and the mandate handed down to the trial 
Court, that, 
''It becomes necessary for the court to reassess the 
damage for the taking, on a basis of the replacement 
cost * * * . " 
The formula for computation of the amount of the 
award under this ruling, we submit, was not followed by 
Judge Nelson in the judgment here now appealed from. 
We submit that it is the rule and law of this case 
that, as to the land taken, it was, and is the duty of the 
trial Judge to first factually determine that there existed, 
at the time of the commencement of the action, compar· 
able land available, and how many acres of that land it 
would require considering its quality and location in 
comparison with the land of the Church being condemned. 
This requires an appraisement of the land remaining 
to Berg, and what its relative productive value was com-
pared to the Church land taken. 
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I 
The prire of $400.00 per acre was fixed by Berg 
upon all of his 15 plus <Wres. 'Yhat the A ttorne:, General 
has done, and what the trial Court has seemingly as-
sumed. is that. acre for arre, the Berg land, whieh he of-
fered, was of equal Yalne in all respects for dairy pur-
posf:ls as that taken from the Church farm. The evidence 
in the ease did not support this conclusion, and it was 
definitely not the holding of this Honorable Supreme 
Court that such was the case. The quoted portion of the 
opinion dearly indicates, we submit, that this Honorable 
Court had in mind the despari ty between the worth of 
the Berg land, and the worth of the Church land. 
The formula adopted by Judge Nelson simply totally 
ignores the matter of replacement and restoration of eco-
nomic balance of the farm, but adopts the single element: 
namely, the acre value in place of the land taken. 
POINT II 
THE AWARD WAS NOT ARRIVED AT IN ACCORD-
ANCE WITH THE RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT 
IN THE CASE. 
The law of this case is that it is ''necessary for the 
Court to reassess the damage for the taking, on the basis 
of the replacement cost.'' In order to arrive at the amount 
of damage, it is necessary for the Court to first de-
termine the quality of the available land offered for re-
placement, acre for acre. This fact has not been found, 
either at the trial of the ease, nor hy this I-Ionorable 
Supreme Court, nor by Judge Nelson sinee. It is true 
that Judge Nelson, in his original decision, gave the in 
place value of $325.00 per acre to the 7.89 acres taken, 
whereas in the judg1nent tendered him by the Attorney 
General, $400.00 is assigned as the per acre value of this 
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same 7.89 acres of land taken. The adoption of the At-
torney General's figure did not change the "arbitrari-
ness.'' 
If, as suggested by Mr .. Justice Wade, it might re-
quire the entire 15.3 acres of Berg's land to replace the 
7.89 acres of the Church land taken, we would be en· 
titled to a judgment for $6,120.00 for the land taken, be-
cause $400.00 per acre was the price Berg fixed for all 
of his land that he offered. There is, accordingly, still 
at least $2,964.00 of margin over and above the decision 
frorn which this appeal is taken, and still within the 
formula of the Supreme Court in the case, as to which 
defendants are entitled to a "judicial" determination. 
POINT III 
THE AWARD DOES NOT CONFORM TO THE 
PROOF IN THE CASE. 
The situation affecting the Berg property was not 
fully explored at the former trial. Some testimony was 
given concerning the nature of the Berg land and its 
value in comparison with the Church land taken. Some 
objections were sustained to evidence to its use and 
value, that is to say, its comparative value as against 
the Church land. 
In our Brief on the Motion for Re-hearing, we at-
tempted to secure from this Honorable Supreme Court, 
a clarification of the opinion as handed down by the 
main opinion written by Mr. Justice Wade, and the brief 
concurring opinion by Mr. Justice 'Volfe. We suggested 
that the imprecisions in the opinion might cause diffi-
culty. We asked these questions : 
"Does it require or permit a new trial? 
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··~lay either party, if so ntinded, produce ad-
ditional evidence upon the question of comparabil-
ityf 
··Or new or additional evidence upon the ques-
tion of the in place value of the land taken 1 
• • And generally, just how is the trial Court to 
proceed to reassess the damages for the property 
on a basis of the replacement cost as well as to assess 
damages, if any, to the two small tracts which are 
severed 1 
'·And, does the court mean to hold that there 
is not a severance damage to the meadow south of 
the new highway1 If not, upon what theory, pray1" 
Each of these questions is now here again. 
First, was a new trial, or re-hearing, or the taking 
of additional evidence necessary or pennissable 1 
And, what was the formula that this Honorable Su-
preme Court would have the trial Judge apply in farm 
land cases for assessing damages? 
Surely, the law is not that the Attorney General may 
write a judgment and have it adopted laissez faire. 
The law does not justify arbitrary judgment, even 
though it may favor one side or the other. Judgment, to 
be lawful, must be based upon full knowledge and impar-
tial weighing of all pertinent facts. 
Having several times driven the highway involved 
in this case and seen the land in place which is involved 
in this appeal, and having heard the evidence taken at 
the trial, we adopt the suggestion made by Mr. Justice 
\Yarle that it might take all of the 15 and a fraction Berg 
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It is at least the hope of the subject that, upon the 
facts to be found under the new formula, a larger meas-
ure will be required to hold the just compensation in 
this cause than the one carried to Court by the state's 
Attorney General. 
POINT V 
THE JUDGMENT IS AGAINST LAW. 
The cornerstone of American Justice is the right to 
an open trial and judgment rendered by the trier of the 
facts, freely and fairly presented to the judge or jury. 
Such a trial has not been had in this case under the 
rule of the case prescribed by the Supreme Court. 
A "reassessment" without hearing "facts" which 
were not offered or which were excluded at the former 
trial because not pertinent, as the Judge then considered, 
is not a fair trial, and a judgment so rendered is not a 
lawful judgment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ARTHUR WOOLLEY, 
Attorney for 
Defendants and Respondents 
617 Eccles Bldg., Ogden, Utah 
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